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Reforms of employment protection (EPL) in Europe eased the recourse to temporary forms of 
employment while not reducing the strictness of EPL of permanent jobs (with the exception 
of Spain). Since 1990, such two-tier reforms have been implemented in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. The paper seeks to show why two-tier 
reforms of EPL have taken place in some countries and have failed on other occasions. This is 
done by having a loser look at the history of national reform processes. In addition the paper 
seeks to determine whether two-tier reforms later led to EPL reforms for permanent jobs. 
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In a globalised world structural change is essential if Europe is to preserve its competi-
tive edge and reduce its unemployment. A major obstacle to structural change is em-
ployment protection. According to the OECD, the summary indicator of the strictness of 
employment protection legislation (EPL) is relatively high in European countries, with 
the exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Switzerland and Denmark. 
 
During the last one and a half decades, reforms of EPL have taken place in some Euro-
pean countries. Governments, however, have pursued a highly selective approach. They 
have left the existing provisions for permanent (or regular) contracts practically unal-
tered (with the exception of Spain) and relaxed only EPL for temporary jobs. Politicians 
hesitate to implement reforms of EPL for permanent jobs because of the resistance of 
their holders. 
 
To avoid conflicts with key constituencies, governments introduce reforms at the mar-
gin of the core labour market. They ease firms’ recourse to temporary forms of em-
ployment while keeping the institutional arrangements for incumbent workers virtually 
intact. They pursue a two-tier reform strategy, “which consists of buying the support of 
incumbent employees by granting that the new arrangements will only apply to new 
contracts, not to them” (Saint-Paul 2000, 227). In the long run this strategy may, how-
ever, lead to a growing share of temporary workers in total employment and build up 
support for subsequent reforms of EPL for permanent workers. 
 
Between 1990 and 2003 two-tier reforms have been implemented in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. Spain started its EPL reforms at 
the margin in 1984 and reformed the core of its labour market in the 1990s. Denmark 
(on another occasion in 2001) and France tried to reform EPL at the margin but failed. 
The most prevalent path of reform consisted in facilitating the use of fixed-term con-
tracts (FTCs) and/or hiring workers from temporary work agencies (TWAs). 
 
The paper seeks to show why two-tier reforms of EPL have taken place in some coun-
tries and have failed on other occasions. It analyzes the conditions prevailing in coun-
tries with implemented reforms and those prevailing in countries with reform failures.   3
This is done by having a loser look at the history of national reform processes. In addi-




2  Employment protection reforms since 1990 
 
According to the OECD, the summary indicators of the strictness of EPL are much 
higher in continental European countries
1 than in English-speaking OECD countries, 
with higher scores representing stricter regulation. This is true for version 1 of the 
OECD summary indicators, which refers to EPL for regular and temporary jobs, as well 
as for version 2, which in addition includes the regulation of collective dismissals 
(OECD 2004, 117). The only exceptions are Switzerland and Denmark, which have a 
liberal EPL, comparable to the English speaking OECD countries.  
 
Since 1990 reforms of EPL have taken place in several European countries. With the 
exception of Spain these reforms left, however, the existing regulations for regular con-
tracts practically unaltered because of (potential) political opposition (see Figure 1 left 
side and Table 1). They focused instead on EPL for temporary forms of employment, 
because such reforms are not confronted with the opposition of incumbent workers to 
the same extent. Less strictness of EPL for temporary employment provides greater 
flexibility at the margin of the core labour market. Because of putting emphasis on only 
one part of labour contracts, such reforms are called two-tier reforms of EPL. However, 
the reforms did not take place in all European countries but only in some countries. 
These countries are - as already mentioned - Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, It-
aly, the Netherlands and Sweden. In these countries firms’ recourse to temporary forms 
of employment has been eased considerably, whereas EPL for incumbent workers has 
not been changed to a comparable extent (see Figure 1 right side and Table 1). Spain’s 
reforms of ELP at the margin took place in the 1980s and led to reforms of regular em-
ployment in the 1990s. 
 
                                            
1    The countries included in our study are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. 4 























































Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004, 117.5 









(2) – (1) 
b) 
Austria 0.5  0.0  -0.5 
Belgium 0.0  2.0  2.0 
Denmark 0.0  1.7  1.7 
Finland 0.6  0.0  -0.6 
France -0.2  -0.5  -0.3 
Germany -0.1  2.0  2.1 
Greece 0.1  1.5  1.4 
Ireland 0.0  -0.3  -0.3 
Italy 0.0  3.3  3.3 
Netherlands 0.0  1.2  1.2 
Norway 0.0  0.6  0.6 
Portugal 0.5  0.6  0.1 
Spain 1.3  0.3  -1.0 
Sweden 0.0  2.5  2.5 
Switzerland 0.0  0.0  0.0 
United Kingdom  -0.2  -0.1  0.1 
a) Score 1990 – score 2003. 
b) Reforms at the margin are assumed to have taken place if (2) – (1) is greater than one. 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004, 117; calculations of the author. 
 
 
The reforms at the margin provide more leverage in hiring via temporary contracts. 
They facilitate the use of FTCs or other temporary contracts like hiring workers from 
TWAs. The countries engaged in two-tier reforms of EPL pursued different strategies 
(see Figure 2 and Table 2): 
-  Belgium mainly liberalised FTCs. The main reform took place in 1997. 
-  Denmark and Greece have put their main focus on making temp workers attractive 
for hiring firms. Denmark increased the scope of temporary agency work (TAW) in 
1995. Greece promoted temporary employment by making the use of TAW easier in 
2001. 
-  Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden reduced the strictness of EPL for both 
categories of temporary employment. Germany loosened TWA legislation in 1994   6
and extended the use of FTCs in 1997. The reforms were continued after 2002 within 
the bigger reform project “Agenda 2010”. In Italy the “Treu package” enacted in 
1997 widened the use of FTCs and legalised TWAs. Later on these forms of tempo-
rary work were additionally liberalised. In the Netherlands the flexibility and security 
law of 1999 allowed two renewals of FTCs in three years and liberalised hiring of 
employees of TWAs. In 2001 it implemented the EU Directive 1999/70/EC on FTCs. 
Sweden permitted TWAs in 1993 and extended the scope of FTCs in 1997. 
 7 























































Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004, 115. 8 
Table 2  Reforms of EPL at the margin in Europe, 1990 – 2004 
Country Year  Reform  description 
Belgium  1997  FTCs became renewable; restrictions on TWAs were reduced. 
Denmark  1995  The role of TWAs was recognised by social partners and their scope increased. 
Germany  1994  TWA legislation was loosened. 
 1997  The renewal period for FTCs and TWA contracts is extended; the maximum cu-
mulative duration of successive FTCs increases from 18 to 24 months; FTCs can 
be renewed 3 times; the maximum duration of a TWA contract is 12 months. 
  2002  Maximum duration of TWA contracts was brought to 24 months. 
 2003  Duration of successive FTCs: 4 years (instead of 2 years) for newly created enter-
prises. 
  2004  The restriction on the maximum duration of TWA contracts was abolished. 
Greece  2001  Promotion of temporary employment by making the use of TAW easier. 
 2003  Regulation of the terms and conditions of FTCs by PD 81/2003 in compliance 
with the EU Directive 1999/70/EC. 
  2004  New restrictions on FTC job protection legislation by PD 180/2004. 
Italy  1997  “Treu package” on FTCs widened the number of valid cases for the use of FTCs. 
  1998  Legalisation of TWAs. 
  2000  Extension of the use of TAW; restrictions concerning unskilled workers removed. 
 2001  Decree no.368/2001 reduced constraints imposed on FTCs; it removed the list of 
circumstances in which the use of FTCs is legal. 
  2003  Extension of the use of TAW. 
Netherlands  1999  Flexibility and security law: A maximum of two renewals in three years is al-
lowed; similar rules apply for employees of TWAs. 
  2001  Implementation of the EU Directive 1999/70/EC on FTCs. 
Sweden 1993  TWAs  were  permitted. 
  1997  12 months FTCs available without restrictions; all enterprises are allowed up to 
five persons under such contracts; FTCs can be prolonged up to 18 months. 
FTC:  Fixed-term contract; 
TAW: Temporary agency work; 
TWA: Temporary work agency. 
Sources:  Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti Social Reforms Database; OECD, Employment Outlook 2004, 119-
120; OECD Employment statistics database, synthetic indicators of employment protection indicators, 
a time series of EPL changes (1985-2003); Eiro, different country reports. 
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3  The political economy of EPL reforms: Some ideas 
 
The theoretical literature analysing EPL reforms is rooted in the political economic lit-
erature and in the theory of institutions. An encompassing methodology of analysis has 
not yet been developed. As we will show the prediction of the theoretical literature on 
the driving forces of EPL reforms is ambiguous. According to the literature interest 
groups, politicians (incl. governments), political institutions and political strategies have 
to be taken into account when analyzing the political economy of EPL reforms (see for 
example Castanheira et al. 2006) 
 
Interest groups try to influence policy decisions by voting, lobbying and demonstrating. 
The main interest groups in the case of EPL are the incumbent employees and their un-
ions who want to protect their jobs by a strict EPL. The resistance of incumbent workers 
to EPL reforms is a function of the economic rents they fear to lose. The standard pre-
diction is that when the amount of rents that can be appropriated is large and concen-
trated workers will better organize themselves and are more determined to oppose EPL 
reforms.  
 
Economic rents are the difference between the employee’s wage and his alternative 
wage which may be his unemployment benefit. Rents arise because of microeconomic 
frictions that prevent wages from adjusting and because of the existence of labour mar-
ket institutions such as EPL. A strict EPL improves the bargaining position of insiders 
because they need not expect to lose their jobs with rising wages (Saint-Paul 2000, 2 
and chap.1). EPL creates an own constituency by maintaining a fraction of the work-
force in employment which resists EPL reforms. This “constituency effect” thus gener-
ates a status-quo bias of EPL (Saint-Paul 2000, 12). 
 
Apart from fearing to lose rents incumbent workers might oppose EPL reforms because 
of uncertainty about the reform effect. If gainers and losers cannot be identified before-
hand, there might be a bias against an EPL reform. All incumbent employees may op-
pose a reduction of employment protection, although only workers in unproductive jobs 
would be affected by the reform (OECD 2006, 195). 
 
Whereas employed workers fear being negatively affected by a reduction of the strict-
ness of employment protection, the unemployed stand to benefit. Their chances of find-
ing a job would increase. But workers have a higher propensity to dominate political 
decisions. They are politically much stronger than the unemployed (Fernandez and 
Rodrik 1992, 1146). 
   10
Strong governments can overcome the resistance of incumbent workers to EPL reforms. 
The strength of government is related to the number of independent branches of gov-
ernment (executive and legislative branches), the party composition of these branches, 
the role of the ‘judiciary’ and ‘sub-federal entities’ as players in the political system, 
etc. (Henisz 2000). One determinant of the strength of government is the voting system 
which governs the party composition of government. According to conventional wis-
dom, majority voting systems provide more leeway to the politicians in designing EPL 
reforms than proportional representation. Broad coalition governments are considered to 
be an obstacle to reform. They tend to paralyze decision-making, due to hold-up power 
of some groups (Alesina and Drazen 1992). This opinion, however, has been ques-
tioned. Pagano and Volpin (2005) have found that the proportionality of the voting sys-
tem is positively correlated with employment protection. 
 
In addition to the characteristics of the political system the share of control of some ar-
eas of economic policy between government and social partners reduces the power of 
politicians to implement reforms independently. The concertation of policies amongst 
social partners and state actors (corporatism) has developed historically mainly in the 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Austria, but also in other European coun-
tries. It is part of their economic culture. Successful concertation is built on three pillars: 
Interest groups should have a strong representation, the interest organisations should be 
integrated into the process of policy formation and implementation by government and 
the strategies and actions of the actors should be directed towards coordination (Jochem 
2003). 
 
Policy-makers can overcome insider resistance to EPL reforms by following different 
strategies. They can implement a reform package including reforms that are comple-
mentary to EPL reforms. This package can offer compensating transfers to losers from 
the reform. Or they may introduce EPL reforms at the margin to reduce opposition from 
incumbent workers (OECD 2006, 196-200). 
 
When making use of policy complementarities a reform of one institution creates politi-
cal support for the reform of another institution (Saint-Paul 2004). Lower dismissal pro-
tection may be less worrying to insiders if unemployment benefits become more gener-
ous. Furthermore, reforms in related policy areas may cause mutually reinforcing effects 
on labour market dynamics. Positive economic complementarities increase the prospects 
of success of EPL reforms (Orzag and Snower 1999; Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2005). 
 
Compensating transfers, however, can be difficult to enact. They must be financed by 
collecting revenues. Furthermore, losers from EPL reforms and their (different) losses   11
have to be identified. Given the problem of asymmetric information it will be difficult 
to provide adequate transfers. The cost of compensations will be higher than in the ab-
sence of imperfect information. And finally commitment power of decision-makers may 
be weak. Government coalitions in power today cannot commit future coalitions to con-
tinue their policy. Without a credible commitment governments will not be able to se-
cure the political acceptance of EPL reforms by the losers (Roland 2002). 
 
EPL reforms at the margin can overcome the status quo bias of EPL for permanent jobs. 
Incumbent workers are not directly affected by the reform and potentially they are made 
better off indirectly. According to the model developed by Saint-Paul (2000, 227-253) 
they can earn a higher wage because labour market tightness increases due to the higher 
demand for temporary jobs. And if they lose their job they will benefit from the greater 
job finding probabilities of the unemployed. Whereas incumbent workers seem to bene-
fit from two-tier EPL reforms incumbent firms do not. They must pay higher wages and 
compete on unequal terms with new entrants who face fewer restrictions concerning 
dismissals.  
 
In principle, incumbent workers should be in favour of two-tier EPL reforms but often 
they are not. Two-tier reforms gradually build up a stock of workers with temporary 
contracts. These workers have different interests than those who hold a fixed contract. 
They can be used as a “political constituency” (Saint-Paul 2004, 16) to support subse-
quent reforms of core labour market EPL that the government from the beginning may 
have intended to achieve. They must however be numerous enough to exert political 
power. The incumbent workers may recognise that two-tier systems could perhaps be 
used as an intermediate step towards a complete EPL reform that they are not in favour 
of. This may lead to a rejection of the reform (Saint-Paul 1996, chap. 11; Dewatripont 
and Roland 1992). 
 
In order to smooth out the objections against two-tier EPL reforms being just an inter-
mediate step towards a complete liberalisation of the labour market a conversion clause 
could be embodied in the reform. According to this clause temporary employment can-
not go on indefinitely but only for a limited duration. Afterwards workers have to be 
offered a regular job (Saint-Paul 1996, chap. 11). The introduction of such a conversion 
clause would slow down the flexibilisation of the labour market. 
 
Apart from reducing the resistance of incumbent workers to EPL reforms partial re-
forms - compared to full EPL reforms – have advantages and disadvantages. On the one 
hand they are less costly in terms of compensating transfers, they lower the costs of ex-
perimenting with EPL reforms and can be reversed more easily. On the other hand they   12
yield less efficiency gains, provide less learning about the consequences of EPL reforms 
and are faced with many of the problems of implementing an EPL reform for a regular 
job (Roland 2002). 
 
 




Denmark is an exception among European countries insofar as dismissal rules in 1990 
have been quite flexible. EPL for regular jobs was low. Only hiring workers from 
TWAs was severely restricted. That is why an EPL reform aiming at a reduction of the 
strictness of employment protection could only focus on the use of TAW and cannot be 
characterized as a two-tier reform in the strict sense. In 1990 the legislation on estab-
lishment and operation of TWAs was liberalised. More employment categories were 
allowed to use TAWs. The restrictions on the number of contract renewals were abol-
ished and upper limits as to how long one can be employed on temporary work con-
tracts no longer exist (Andersen and Svarer 2007, 405). Since 1995 the role of TWAs 
has been recognized by social partners and their scope increased. For example, the Dan-
ish Trade Union for Nurses accepted the role of TWAs in the health care sector and has 
entered into collective agreements with TWAs (European Foundation for the Improve-
ment of Living and Working Conditions 2002, 26). 
 
The OECD considers the second reform step – increasing the scope of liberalized 
TWAs - to be the more important one. This makes labour markets more flexible, and it 
also activates the unemployed and increases their employability by assigning them to 
client firms. The TWA reform is thus part of the package of reforms that started in 
1994. These reforms sought to shift the focus from a rather passive labour market policy 
to a more active one. The policy tightened eligibility for unemployment benefits and 
their duration and introduced workfare elements into social policy. A more activating 
approach was adopted (Andersen and Svarer 2007, 391). 
 
How was it possible to implement the 1994-1999 reform? First of all the reform was 
stimulated by high unemployment. Between 1987 and 1993 registered unemployment 
increased, reaching a high of 12 percent in 1993 and in 1994 (Andersen and Svarer 
2007, 392). The rise in unemployment was partly due to the flexicurity system with its 
high net replacement rates of unemployment benefits, their long duration and soft eligi-
bility criteria. The incentives to search for and accept a job had become insufficient.   13
Furthermore, the increase in unemployment was associated with a rising transfer burden 
on public finances. The financial constraints on government exerted pressure to reform 
the unemployment benefit system and to activate the unemployed. The latter aspect of 
the reform responded, moreover, to the increased uncertainty of the unemployed to find 
a new job. 
 
The reform would not have been possible, however, without the approval of the social 
partners. This approval was given because the level of gross unemployment benefit re-
placement rates had been increasing at the time (see OECD summary measure of benefit 
entitlements). High unemployment benefits in Denmark are considered to be an indis-
pensable complement to labour market flexibility. The government tried to avoid the 
negative employment effects of high replacement rates by putting greater emphasis on 
activating the unemployed and increasing their employability. TAW was considered as 
a useful instrument of activation, which at the same time leads to a further increase of 
labour market flexibility. Liberalising the use of TAW and increasing their scope were 
in line with the philosophy of the social partners. They just tried to influence the work-
ing and social conditions of TWA workers by collective agreements. The approval was, 
furthermore, the result of an intensive social dialogue at that time, which was in line 
with the tradition present among social partners in Denmark since the late nineteenth 
century. This dialogue included the government, the social partners and policy commu-
nities at the regional level. Governments in Denmark need this dialogue because they 
generally represent a coalition between minority partners and have to find support from 




Contrary to Denmark, EPL in Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s was rather strict. It 
was comparable to continental European countries. Up to 2003 no major attempt was 
made to reduce the strictness of EPL for regular employment. Instead the main focus 
was put on EPL reforms at the margin. 
 
In 1993 TAW was allowed by law. The new legislation was very liberal. Practically no 
regulation of either the TWA business itself or of temporary work assignments was en-
acted. As a result legal treatment of agency work was among the least interventionist in 
the European Union (Storrie 2002). 
 
In 1997 regulation of FTCs was liberalised. All enterprises were allowed to employ up 
to five persons on an FTC for 12 months (during a three year period) without any re-
strictions, that is to say, without any need to specify a particular reason for employment,   14
as before. The period could be extended up to 18 months if the firm was newly estab-
lished. The new law also addressed the issue of repeated contracts of fixed duration for 
leave replacements. It stated that if a leave replacement was employed for a total dura-
tion of three years during a five-year period, then the contract would become open-
ended. A third element of the law was the opportunity to bargain on derogations from 
statutory law regarding FTCs at the local and not, as before, only at the national level 
(Holmlund and Storrie 2002).   
 
The 1993 TWA reform was induced by the growth of unemployment at the beginning of 
the 1990s. The standardised unemployment rate increased from 1.7 percent in 1990 to 
9.1 percent in 2003 (OECD 1999, 224). The reform was enacted by a coalition govern-
ment led by the conservative party. The law was not the result of a tripartite agreement. 
Corporatism in Sweden had been in a crisis at that time (Jochem 2003). The reform was 
instead promoted unilaterally by the conservative government. It was not very contro-
versial and did not significantly enter the public debate. The unions did not oppose the 
reform. It did not negatively affect incumbent workers. On the contrary, as unemploy-
ment had increased in Sweden in the early 1990s, workers feared losing their jobs and 
could possibly benefit from the greater job finding probabilities of the unemployed as a 
result of this two-tier EPL reform. The unions were, however, eager to establish accept-
able working conditions by means of collective agreements (Storrie 2002, 16). 
 
The conditions for the realisation of the FTC reform in 1997 were quite similar to those 
of the 1993 reform with the exception of the Social Democrats being in power again. 




Regarding employment protection for regular jobs, in the beginning of the 1990s the 
Netherlands had one of the most restrictive systems in Europe. Flexibility at the margin 
of the labour market was, however, higher than at its core. In the 1990s public policy 
increased the duality of the labour market. In 1998 and in 1999 two major reforms be-
came effective.  
 
The Law on the Allocation of Workers through Intermediaries (WAADI) of 1998 abol-
ished rigid rules for TWAs. Agencies no longer needed a license and could assign 
workers to client firms in all sectors. There was no longer a maximum period for as-
signment. Agency workers could obtain a permanent contract with the agency and be-
came eligible for fringe benefits (Camps 2004; Van Oorschot 2004). 
   15
The Flexibility and Security Act of 1999 made it somewhat easier for firms to use tem-
porary employment contracts. The possibilities to renew a temporary contract increased 
substantially. An employer could offer an employee a temporary contract for three 
times, within a period of three years. In return, the Act aimed at increasing the prospect 
of a permanent contract for temporary workers. If the maximum period between the 
temporary contracts was less than three months, the fourth contract automatically be-
came a permanent contract. Moreover, if the duration of consecutive temporary con-
tracts exceeded 36 months, the contract automatically converted into a permanent con-
tract. The Flexibility and Security Act thus contained a conversion clause (Camps 2004; 
Deelen, Jongen and Visser 2006). 
 
The Dutch EPL reforms of 1998 and 1999 were formulated and implemented in the tra-
ditional framework characterized by strong social partnership. In the mid-1990s, the 
Cabinet submitted the proposal of the Flexibility and Security Act to the social partners 
for consultation. The Labour Foundation was asked for its advice and formulated rec-
ommendations known as the “Star Agreement”. This agreement represented a consensus 
of the social partners for adapting labour law. The Cabinet accepted the Labour Founda-
tion’s advice virtually unchanged (Camps 2004). 
 
The consensus between the social partners was reached because EPL reforms did not 
deteriorate the position of the incumbent employees and because the strictness of EPL at 
the margin was reduced only moderately. Moreover, the reforms contained a conversion 
clause in order to prevent an erosion of the core labour market. In addition, the reforms 
were composed of a package deal that provided compensation for accepting higher 
flexibility by raising employment security of flexible jobs and by providing higher 
benefits and training. Flexibility was combined with a careful balance of rights and ob-
ligations for employers and employees. The pragmatic tripartite decision-making was 
also supported by the strong position of expert committees (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 




EPL in Germany is characterized by a high strictness of dismissal protection for regular 
contracts. Since 1990 no major reform took place in this field. Reforms only addressed 
the firm size threshold and the range of social selection criteria. Temporary employment 
was heavily restricted at the beginning of the 1990s too. Two-tier EPL reforms did, 
however, take place during the last 15 years. They adressed liberalisation of the use of 
FTCs and of TAW. 
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FTCs were first liberalised under the Kohl government in 1997. The maximum period 
of FTCs was increased from 18 to 24 months. After two years an individual could not 
be employed any longer on a temporary basis without valid reasons. In 2003 the SPD-
Green coalition allowed the use of FTCs up to four years for newly created enterprises 
after their start-up. Deviations through collective agreements were, however, possible. 
 
TWAs have been severely restricted in the past. TWA workers could be assigned only 
for a limited time. The assignment period was extended stepwise from nine months in 
1994 to 12 months in 1997 and to 24 months in 2002. In 2004 the limit was completely 
abolished (Table 2). The most recent changes implemented as part of the Hartz reforms 
removed nearly all remaining restrictions. At the same time the equal treatment of 
agency workers and of the regular staff of hiring firms was established, unless collective 
agreements regulated wages of TWA employees (Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst 2006). 
 
A reduction of the strictness of EPL for regular employment was seen as politically un-
feasible because insiders of the core labour market defended by unions resisted deregu-
latory reforms. In Germany insiders have a strong position in politics through the work-
ers wings in the Social-Democratic and Christian-Democratic parties, through influenc-
ing the results of elections and through their strong role in the field of industrial rela-
tions. German governments, which are relatively weak due to the necessity of forming 
coalition governments and of joint decision taking with the Federal Council, were not 
able to overcome this resistance. Furthermore, the two major political parties, the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Social democrats, did not advocate a fundamental EPL reform 
of the core employment relations. As the institutional prerequisites for tripartite negotia-
tions were lacking, tripartite agreements could also not mobilise reforms of the core 
labour market. The little impact of tripartite negotiations was demonstrated by the “Al-
liance for Jobs, Vocational Training and Competitiveness” initiated in the late 1990s by 
the SPD-Green coalition. In contrast to Denmark und the Netherlands, Germany was not 
able to address the need to reform via social pacts (Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst 2006; 
Streeck 2003). 
 
EPL reforms at the margin that do not call into question the labour market positions of 
insiders have been a feasible option for the German political system. They were at least 
a modest attempt to fight unemployment, which had risen because of structural adjust-
ments in the course of German unification. But even the partial reforms were not easy to 
undertake. The modest reforms of the Kohl government in the mid-1990s were accused 
by the Social Democrates in the election campaign of 1998 of being socially unjust. The 
Hartz reforms und the subsequent “Agenda 2010”, which were implemented by the 
strong leadership of chancellor Schröder and his SPD-Green coalition after 2002 were   17
also difficult to implement. The complete liberalisation of TWAs had to be comple-
mented by passing a law on the above-mentioned equal treatment of TWA workers and 
the regular employees in order to weaken the position of the TWAs. Nevertheless, resis-
tance to this reform and to the other “Agenda 2010” reforms was great and led to a loss 
of electoral support of the Schröder coalition in 2005. The positive effects of the 




For a long time open-ended employment has been the standard contract in Italy. The 
strictness of EPL for regular jobs is high and has not yet been reduced. Temporary em-
ployment relationships were stringently regulated. Few activities were allowed to use 
temporary employment (Bertola and Garibaldi 2002, Box 3). Only since the mid-1990s 
have major steps towards the liberalisation of temporary employment been made. 
 
The reform process was initiated in 1997 by the “Treu Law”, named after then Labour 
Minister Tiziano Treu. Further steps aimed at creating a more flexible labour market at 
the margin were made up to 2003. The reforms focused on the liberalisation of FTCs as 
well as on TWAs. 
 
FTCs were traditionally limited to few objective situations. In 1987, collective agree-
ments were allowed to extend the use of FTCs, specifying target groups (youth and un-
employed), motivations and employment shares. The statutory regulation concerning 
the utilisation and renewal of FTCs remained strict, however. FTCs could be extended 
only once and for a period shorter than the initial relationship. Otherwise the contract 
would have converted into a permanent one (Nannicini 2004). The “Treu Law” reduced 
the application of drastic sanctions in case of violation of FTCs’ discipline and limited 
them to serious cases. Moreover, the number of applicable cases for the use of FTCs 
was widened. In 2001 the EU Directive on FTCs was implemented through a joint 
statement by two of the three major Italian trade union confederations. Decree 368 re-
duced the constraints formally imposed on FTCs. In particular, it removed the explicit 
list of circumstances in which the use of FTCs is legal (Table 2).  
 
In addition to FTCs the “Treu law” legalised and regulated TWAs. It stated that TAW 
employment is allowed in all but the following cases: Lowest positions of the job lad-
der, replacement of workers on strike, firms that experienced collective dismissals in the 
previous 12 months, jobs that require medical vigilance. The budget law of 2000 ruled 
out the prohibition of TWAs for the lowest position of the job ladder. In 2003 the use of   18
TWA contracts was extended even more. The “Treu Law” does not set a maximum du-
ration of assignments or legal motivations for using TWA workers (Nannicini 2004). 
 
The provision of further regulation was left to collective bargaining. Collective agree-
ments have typically stipulated that temporary workers cannot exceed 8 to 15 percent of 
normal employees (depending on the sector). Moreover, they have constrained the al-
lowed motivations for using TAW: peak activity, one-off work and skills not available 
within the firm. Firms cannot extend an individual TWA contract more than four times 
for a cumulated period longer than 24 months (Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini 2005). 
 
Up to the mid-1990s the strictness of EPL had hardly been reduced. The economic crisis 
of the early 1990s and the sharp rise in unemployment (Bertola and Garibaldi 2002) 
made an EPL reform urgent, however. Traditionally economic reforms in Italy are the 
result of tripartite negotiations between government, the strong employers’ association 
Confindustria and the trade union confederations CGIL, CISL and UIL. From April 
1993 to the end of 2000, social partners have been confronted with seven different gov-
ernments which were not strong enough to overcome the resistance of labour unions to 
reform EPL for regular jobs. Government was lacking continuity and credibility for a 
concerted fundamental reform (Negrelli 2000). Only an EPL reform at the margin that 
would not directly touch the interests of the incumbent workers was feasible. But al-
though the liberalisation of TWAs was accompanied by a considerable rise of unem-
ployment benefits between 1997 and 1999 (see OECD summary measure of unem-
ployment entitlements), it was strongly debated. 
 
The framework for political reforms changed with Berlusconi coming to power in June 
2001. A concerted social policy, which implies that government, employers’ organisa-
tion and trade unions share responsibility in regulating economic and social policies, 
was replaced by social dialogue. This meant that government maintained its autonomy 





In 1990 EPL for regular employment was not very strict in Belgium, whereas the use of 
temporary employment contracts was highly restricted. During the last 15 years, how-
ever, FTCs have been liberalised, whereas the regulation of TAW has been broadly left 
unchanged since 1987. 
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Up to 1997 successive FTCs could be concluded if objectives reasons, such as the na-
ture of work, were given. The reforms during the 1990s have made recourse to succes-
sive FTCs possible also under the following conditions: Four successive FTCs, each of 
which must be of at least three months duration, can be concluded during a maximum 
period of two years. Six successive FTCs, each of at least six months duration, can be 
concluded during a maximum period of three years with the authorisation of the social 
and labour inspectorate (Blanpain 2007). 
 
The legal basis for the regulation of TWAs in Belgium is provided by the law on TWA 
of 24 July 1987. Assignments of TWA workers are only justified by objective reasons 
and prohibited in certain sectors. The maximum duration of an assignment is six months 
with one possible extension. Since 2000 long-term unemployed can be assigned on 




At the beginning of the 1990s the Greek EPL of regular employment was characterised 
by a medium level of strictness, whereas the use of temporary employment contracts 
was highly restricted. During the last 15 years EPL of regular employment has not been 
liberalised. The legislation of FTCs has been reformed without reducing its strictness. 
Only the use of TAW has been legalised and at the same time liberalised. 
 
Up to 2003 FTCs were conditional on objective reasons with the exception of public 
service. In 2003 the EU Directive on fixed-term work was implemented without any 
major modifications of the Directive (Soumeli 2003). In 2004 new restrictions on the 
use of FTCs were imposed by Presidential Decree 180/2004 (FRDB Social Reform Da-
tabase). 
 
In 2001 a regulatory framework was established for the use of TAW. The new legisla-
tion for the first time laid down specific rules for TWAs. They focussed on the usual 
fields of regulation (Soumeli 2001). According to the OECD (2004) the use of TWA 





Inherited from the Franco era at the beginning of the 1980s the system of individual 
dismissal protection was very restrictive in Spain. In 1984, when the unemployment rate 
was 20.1 percent, the socialist government liberalised FTCs, while the protection of 
permanent contracts was kept. The use of FTCs for regular activities was eased consid-
erably. FTCs could be created up to a maximum duration of three years. The termina-
tion of FTCs could not be appealed to labour courts. Little or no termination compensa-
tion was offered to workers. As a result the firing costs of FTCs were much lower than 
the firing costs of permanent employment contracts. 
 
EPL reforms in Spain are normally negotiated in trilateral talks by government, em-
ployers and trade unions. Liberalisation of FTCs in 1984 was the result of very high 
unemployment, the low prospects of the unemployed to find a job and the increase of 
unemployment benefits, which forced the unions to make concessions. As a result of the 









An example of a reform failure is the 2001 attempt of the Conservative government to 
reduce the costs of the unemployment benefit system, which is considered in Denmark 
as a complement of a flexible labour market. Hoping that the momentum of the success-
ful 1994-1999 reform would facilitate their acceptance and implementation, the gov-
ernment submitted the following reform proposals: (1) only people working less than 21 
hours a week (instead of 28) should be entitled to unemployment benefits; (2) tempo-
rary agency workers etc. should no longer receive extra benefits on a permanent basis 
and a maximum of 52 weeks’ benefit should apply to all employees; (3) employees with 
a monthly wage of more than €3360 should have their first benefit postponed; (4) the 
benefit rate should be based on the average salary over the past six months (instead of 
three) (Castanheira et al. 2006, 185-186). Because of strong opposition from the em-
ployers’ organisation and two out of three labour unions, the government withdrew the   21
project in 2003. In 2004 the government tried again to reduce the level of unemploy-
ment benefits but again had to withdraw the proposals. 
 
The reform failure was due to mainly two factors. The government did not include the 
employers’ organisation and the labour unions in the preparation of the reforms. It did 
not make use of the consensus-creating institutions in labour market policy, the corpora-
tist steering arrangements, which are typical for Denmark. Furthermore, the government 
did not acknowledge that the intended reform would have altered the existing social 
pact. Especially labour unions in Denmark take it for granted that higher unemployment 
benefits have to offset higher labour market flexibility. Low unemployment benefits and 
high labour market flexibility are considered to be exclusive. Labour market reforms 





Another example of a reform failure is the 2006 attempt of the Conservative Govern-
ment to enact the “Contrat Premiere Embauche” (CPE). In France, a country with a high 
level of EPL, reducing dismissal protection for regular employment is hardly possible. 
That is why government tried to promote flexibility at the margin of the labour market. 
In 2005, the “Contrat Nouvelle Embauche” (CNE) was enacted. It aimed at bringing 
flexibility to small companies by allowing employers to fire at will during the first two 
years of employment. In 2006, the government tried to apply the idea of the CNE to all 
young employees under 26. The CPE was very unpopular. It met with heavy resistance 
from students, all trade unions, the left-wing political parties and some centrist oppo-
nents. On April 10, 2006 the French government decided to withdraw the CPE.  
 
Why did the French government fail to pass the CPE? The French government is strong 
in institutional terms (Levy 2005), but it was not supported much by the centre-right and 
by the left parties, which are not advocates of “neo-liberal” reforms. Furthermore its 
relations with unions, student and public employees are tense and prone to conflict 
(Eichhorst 2007). The government did not include the social partners and the students 
sufficiently in the preparation of the CPE. It was convinced that the previous CNE 
would facilitate the passage of the CPE. The government was surprised by the most 
significant public unrest since 1968. Negotiations with labour unions and students dem-
onstrating in the streets proved to be impossible. In order to avoid defeat in the next 
elections, the government rescinded the CPE. 
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6  Comparative analysis: How to gain political support for two-tier EPL reforms 
 
Since 1990 the strictness of EPL for regular jobs has not been reduced in the EU-15 
with the exception of the 1994 and 1997 reforms in Spain. The resistance of incumbent 
workers to reform attempts has been strong and governments have preferred to avoid 
conflicts with unions. An increase in unemployment did not support EPL reforms of the 
core labour market because workers tried to protect their jobs. 
 
EPL reforms at the margin have, however, been implemented in some countries. A rise 
of unemployment helped bring about this kind of reform. The unemployed were aware 
of the increase of their job finding probabilities. And the incumbent workers were con-
vinced to win too.  
 
Apart from the socioeconomic conditions reforms at the margin have only been realized 
if governments took into account the specific reform conditions prevailing in their coun-
tries: the interests of the public and of the social partners and the characteristics of the 
decision making processes of governments. In countries with relatively weak govern-
ments and strong social partners, governments had to come to an agreement with the 
social partners in order to implement reforms. A social dialogue had to precede negotia-
tions within government and parliament. Governments in Denmark, generally represent-
ing a coalition between minority partners, used this dialogue in order to gain support 
from different social groups for their 1994-1999 reforms. The Dutch EPL reforms of 
1998 and 1999 were formulated in the traditional framework too, seeking for a consen-
sus with the social partners. The relatively weak governments in Italy and in Germany 
in the 1990s tried to find support of the unions for their EPL reforms at the margin. It 
proved, however, to be difficult to come to an agreement. 
 
Governments that are relatively strong can overcome the resistance of social groups 
against EPL reforms more easily. The 1993 and 1997 reforms in Sweden had been pro-
moted unilaterally by government because corporatism had been in a crisis at that time. 
The Hartz reforms and the subsequent “Agenda 2010” in Germany were implemented 
by the strong leadership of Chancellor Schröder, although resistance to these reforms 
was high. The Berlusconi government, coming into power in June 2001, was able to 
extend the use of TWA with the unions playing only a subordinate role in consultations. 
 
If the preconditions for a successful implementation of reforms are not complied with, 
reform proposals fail. This has been the case in Denmark with the 2001 attempt to re-
duce unemployment benefits, which are considered as a complement to a flexible labour 
market. The government did not include the social partners into the preparation of the   23
reforms, a procedure which is untypical in Denmark. Because of strong opposition, the 
government had to withdraw the project. The same was true in France where govern-
ment did not include the unions and the students in the preparation of the “Contrat Pre-
miere Embauche” (CPE). Powerful demonstrations forced the government to withdraw 
the CPE. 
 
Apart from taking into account the prevailing reform conditions, government can over-
come the resistance against EPL reforms by offering compensations. In Denmark the 
liberalisation of the use of TAW was accepted by the unions because government in-
creased the already high level of unemployment benefits. In the Netherlands the liber-
alisation of TWAs was made acceptable by providing higher unemployment benefits 
and training for workers with temporary contracts. In Italy and Spain unemployment 
benefits have been increased too. In Germany the liberalisation of the use of TWA 
workers was complemented by a law on the equal treatment of TAW and regular work. 
 
Resistance against two-tier reforms may result from incumbent workers’ fear that an 
increase of the proportion of temporary workers may lead to an EPL reform of regular 
workers, which they do not favour. In order to overcome these objections, a conversion 
clause can be embodied in the reform. This clause transforms temporary contracts into 
permanent contracts under certain conditions and thus limits the increase of temporary 
contracts. Conversion clauses played a role in the Netherlands’ 1999 reform and in 
Sweden’s 1997 reform. 
 
 
7  Induced reform of EPL of regular employment 
 
The main idea of two-tier reforms of EPL is as follows. To avoid conflicts with incum-
bent workers, governments introduce EPL reforms at the margin. The existing dismissal 
protection of incumbent workers is kept. This approach reinforces labour market dual-
ity. The proportion of temporary workers in total employment increases. With a greater 
part of the labour force in unstable jobs, the political constellations change. Support for 
subsequent reforms of core labour market EPL may gradually build up. 
 
A precondition for this to function is an increase in the proportion of temporary workers 
in total employment. The European Community Labour Force Survey provides informa-
tion on FTC employment but excludes TWA employment and other types of temporary 
employment. Table 3 shows that the liberalisation of the use of FTCs resulted in an in-
crease of the proportion of FTC employment in total employment. This increase started   24
in 1997 in Belgium, Germany, Italy and Sweden and in 1984 in Spain. Only in the 
Netherlands has FTC employment increased (since the first half of the 1990s) without 
any major previous reform. In all the countries the proportion of FTC employment in 
total employment did not surpass 16 percent. Only in Spain did this proportion surge 
rapidly in the second half of the 1980s, staying above 30 percent since 1990. Adding 
TWA employment does not lead to a substantial increase of temporary employment 
compared to FTC employment, as the number of TWA workers is relatively low (Table 
4). 
 
Table 3  Employment on fixed-term contracts as % of total employment 
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Belgium  6.9 5.3 5.3 9.1 8.9 
Denmark    12.3  10.8  12.1 9.7 9.8 
Germany 10.0 
a) 10.5 
a)  10.4 12.7 14.1 
Greece    21.1 16.5 10.2 13.5 11.8 
Italy  4.8  5.2  7.2 10.1 12.3 
Netherlands  7.5  7.6 11.4 13.7 15.5 
Spain  15.6 29.8 35.0 32.2 33.3 
Sweden  11.9 10.0 12.5 15.8 16.0 
EU-15 8.4 
a) 10.4 
a)  11.5 13.7 14.4 
a)   Excl. the new German Länder. 
Source: EU, Employment in Europe, var. vol. 
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Table 4   Temporary agency workers as % of total employment 
 1999  2004 
Belgium 1.6  2.2 
Denmark   0.7  0.3 
Germany 0.7  1.2 
Greece   0.0  … 
Italy 0.2  0.6 
Netherlands 4.0  2.5 
Spain 0.8 0.8 
Sweden 0.8  1.0 
EU-15 1.4  … 
Sources: Column 1: Storrie (2002, 28); Column 2: Arrowsmith (2006, 6). 
 
 
The increase of temporary employment did not result in EPL reforms of regular em-
ployment with the exception of Spain. In the majority of the countries, the proportion of 
temporary employment in total employment was presumably too small to change the 
political environment for EPL reforms. In Spain, however, EPL reforms of the core la-
bour market took place in 1994 and in 1997, although the reforms were opposed by the 
unions since their members felt threatened by the massive dismissals during the serious 
recession between 1992 and 1994. But the resistance of the unions was not strong 
enough. 
 
Dolado and Jimeno (2004) provide the following explanation for the implementation of 
the 1994 and 1997 reforms. Due to the growing number of temporary workers, the share 
of regular workers in the total active population had dropped below 50 percent in 1994. 
The median voter was no longer a regular worker but rather a temporary or an unem-
ployed person, a fact which might have influenced the decision of the government. This 
fact may also account for the relatively low resistance of the unions (representing first 
of all the incumbent workers) towards reforms that increase the chances of temporary 
workers and unemployed persons to obtain a regular job and lower job security of the 
incumbent workers. The 1984 reform had thus created the conditions for the reform of 
regular contracts ten years later. The low resistance of the unions may have also been 
due to the government offering compensations, such as providing higher unemployment 
benefits, additional rights for temporary workers, a better regulation of training etc. 
(Castanheira et al. 2006, 231). 
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The 1994 and 1997 reforms aimed at “undoing the liberalisation of 1984” (Dolado et al. 
2002, F274) and reducing the incidence of temporary employment. In 1994, the condi-
tions for the use of FTCs were restricted, while the costs of individual dismissal of regu-
lar workers were reduced. In 1997, negotiations initiated by the Conservative govern-
ment led the social partners to sign an agreement calling for the creation of a new per-
manent contract with lower firing costs in the case of unfair dismissals, entailing a man-
datory severance pay of 33 days’ wages per year of seniority with a maximum of 24 
months of wages (instead of 45 and 42, respectively, under the regular permanent con-
tracts). This new contract could be used for most new hires over a four-year period 





During the last one and a half decades, reforms of EPL in Europe eased the recourse to 
temporary forms of employment while not reducing the strictness of EPL of permanent 
jobs (with the exception of Spain). Such two-tier reforms have been implemented in 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. Spain started 
its EPL reforms at the margin in 1984 and reformed the core of its labour market in the 
1990s. 
 
Two-tier EPL reforms are confronted with less resistance from incumbent workers than 
EPL reforms of permanent jobs. Nevertheless, not all European countries have imple-
mented EPL reforms at the margin. Two-tier reforms have been realized when govern-
ments have taken into account the specific reform conditions prevailing in their coun-
tries. In Denmark, France, and the Netherlands, coalition governments had to come to 
an agreement with the social partners in order to implement reforms. (In Denmark gov-
ernments succeeded and failed on different occasions, in France government failed.) 
When governments were relatively strong, as was the case in Sweden in the 1990s, in 
Germany under the leadership of chancellor Schröder and in Italy under Berlusconi, 
they overcame the resistance of the unions against EPL reforms more easily. The im-
plementation of reforms was supported by offering compensations, mainly as higher 
unemployment benefits. This was the case in Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy 
and Spain. Conversion clauses have weakened the objections against two-tier EPL re-
forms too, as is demonstrated by the Netherlands’ 1999 reform and Sweden’s 1997 re-
form. 
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With the exception of Spain, two-tier reforms did not induce EPL reforms of permanent 
employment. Presumably the achieved proportion of temporary employment in total 
employment did not change the political constellation to such an extent that EPL re-
forms of permanent employment would have become possible. In Spain, however, the 
share of permanent workers in the total active population dropped below 50 percent in 
1994 due to the growing number of temporary workers. The median voter was no longer 
a regular worker, a fact which seemed to have influenced the behaviour of the unions 
and the decisions of the government. 
 
It is questionable whether the strategy of reducing the strictness of EPL for permanent 
jobs via two-tier EPL reforms is a feasible strategy. A precondition for this reform chain 
to work is a radical EPL reform at the margin in the beginning. It is unlikely that a re-
form as radical as in Spain after the end of the Franco era will be implemented in other 
countries. Minor reforms which are not ambitious will however be implemented.   28
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